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SIR GEORGE DOWNING AND THE REGICIDES

THE Royalists who came into power upon the restoration of the English monarch in 1660 were resolved to avenge their losses and sufferings upon their enemies. They soon discovered, however, that little could be done except against the regicides, the men who had sat in judgment upon Charles I., or who had taken some part in the court proceedings, or in the execution of the king. For these persons no one had a word of justification or excuse.

The regicides, including under that term all who took any part in the death of King Charles, numbered about one hundred persons. Of this number twenty-five had died, and so could not be reached. Of the remainder, a score were able to save themselves from loss or suffering because they had taken too slight a part in the crime to be held strictly responsible, or because they had rendered service in the Restoration, or because they hastened to make a humble submission and to submit base and false apologies. Twenty-nine of the remainder were immediately seized upon, tried for high treason, and found guilty. Ten of these were executed, of whom only six had actually taken part in the trial of the king. The rest of the condemned were punished by the infliction of penalties less than death. Of all the other regicides, only nineteen escaped the vengeance of their enemies. These nineteen made good their escape from justice by flight. Three of them came to New England, and the remaining sixteen found a precarious refuge on the Continent. Parliament attainted them. Their property was confiscated, and they were liable to immediate execution as traitors if they fell into the power of the English government.

It goes without saying that strenuous efforts were made to lay hands upon these outlaws. Attempts to do so were made in New England, in Geneva, in Germany, in Switzerland, and in the United Provinces. It is the story of the success of the efforts made in the Netherlands that will be related here.

As early as September, 1660, Charles II. sent to the Hague a Catholic priest by the name of O'Neill, to present several matters to the government of Holland, and among these one concerning the surrender of certain regicides then in that province. Johan de Witt, at that time head of the provincial government, declared his willingness, as a favor to the newly-restored monarch, to assent to the issue of a warrant for the arrest of the regicides, but said that before

doing so he must be furnished with the names of the persons O'Neill apparently did not supply these, and nothing further came of this attempt.¹ The truth is that the authorities of Holland were unwilling to make the surrender. Clarendon complained of this, and received an answer to the effect that the provinces were bound to reckon with the fact that the Netherlands were well known to grant freedom to everyone who came there, and that nothing could be done against the liberties of the states.²

In December, 1660, Sir William Davidson, a Scottish merchant residing in Amsterdam and a sturdy Royalist, appealed to the burgomasters of that city for assistance in capturing some of the fugitives then present there, but in Amsterdam such an appeal could not succeed. Instead of granting the assistance prayed for, the burgomasters ordered the police to give no aid to Davidson. Sir William hereupon hurried off to the Hague to get a warrant for the arrest of the fugitives from the Estates of Holland, but nothing came of his efforts.³

Matters stood thus, when Sir George Downing came to the Hague in the capacity of envoy extraordinary for the king. He had occupied a similar position there under Cromwell and under the Commonwealth, and had been a friend of many of the regicides. He had shared in the benefits which accrued to those who loyally supported Oliver, and it was hardly to be expected that he would make any serious effort to deliver any of his old friends to certain death. But he was extremely anxious to prove his loyalty to the new sovereign, and so increase his own fortunes. He declared to Clarendon that he would do "as much as if my life lay at stake in the busines" and that "if my father were in the way I would not avoyde him for my Loyalty".⁴ This was characteristic of the man. He was perfectly willing to sacrifice his nearest and dearest to the master whose bread he ate, whether that master was called Oliver or Charles. He was always true to those who paid him.

Downing was thoroughly qualified for the business of catching the regicides. He was a man of unlimited energy and of endless persistency. He had by nature a mind of intense activity and intense subtlety. He was quick to see a point and never failed

¹ N. Japikse, *De Verwickelingen tusschen de Republiek en Engeland van 1660-1665*, Bijlage I.

² *Ibid.*, p. 193 and n. 2, with reference to the correspondence in the Rijksarchief, of the ambassadors in England with the griffier, April 22, 1661.

³ Russell (?) to Nicholas (?), December 20, 1660. *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1660-1661*, p. 420.

⁴ Downing to Clarendon, October 21, 1661. Clarendon MSS., vol. 105, f. 71. Bodleian Library.

to get all the advantage possible out of it. He was extremely skilful in making the worse appear the better reason. Finally, he was quite unscrupulous. He had added to his natural endowment in craft and cunning by a long experience as Scout-Master General in Cromwell's army. In that capacity he had devoted himself to the business of hiring and training spies, and to the securing of information by bribes, cajolery, threats, and violence. In this occupation he became thoroughly versed in the knowledge both of the weak and of the evil sides of human nature and of the motives which would most effectually appeal to weak and evil men. He was quick to read character. Above all, he was a past-master in the arts of corruption. He seems never to have met a man without at once making a mental note as to his price.

The reasons determining the states of the Netherlands in their policy of not lending assistance toward the apprehension of the regicides were the following: the provinces were known to be a refuge for all political offenders; it had always been the custom in the Netherlands that such offenders should not be molested. Indeed, they had lately refused the arrest, not to say the extradition, of certain Frenchmen, who had been adjudged to death in France, and application for whose arrest had been made by Louis XIV.;⁵ moreover, if the states should consent to such seizures, they felt bound beforehand to issue a proclamation warning the fugitives of their danger; again, there was no treaty with England by which that state could demand the arrest and extradition of fugitives from its justice. Of course all these considerations might be brushed aside, and in spite of them Holland might take the action desired by Downing. But this no one expected would be done. The regicides were therefore justified in believing themselves safe within its boundaries. Their surrender under the circumstances would be a humiliation to the Dutch and a breach of confidence towards the fugitives. It must be added that even if the state were willing to give them up, there would still be a considerable difficulty in doing so, because they had a large number of friends in the Netherlands, both Dutch and English, who were constantly on the watch to forewarn them in case any attempt was made to seize them.

Downing might well consider the obstacles in his way insuperable. But he was not a man to believe anything he wished impossible, and as soon as he arrived in the Hague, in June, 1661, he began to search out the places where the fugitives lay hidden. He

⁵ Aitzema, *Saken van Staet en Oorlogh* (folio ed.), IV, 896. Downing writing to Clarendon, August 12, 1661, says that the states had twice denied a request for a warrant for arresting political prisoners. Clarendon MSS., vol. 104, f. 228.

immediately discovered that Rotterdam was full of disaffected Englishmen and that the regicides were frequently there.⁶ He had been in the Netherlands only a month when he wrote Clarendon that he had hopes of catching some of them, but was troubled as to the best method of proceeding. He feared that if he applied to the Estates of Holland for a warrant for their arrest, the fact would become known to the regicides before the warrant could be served. He would therefore prefer to seize them without a warrant and ship them off to England. He wished, however, to have exact instructions from the home government before using violent and illegal means.⁷ This was Downing through and through. He was always for striking first and explaining afterwards. And he was always careful to be quite safe himself. He did not intend to do the king a great service and then find himself repudiated. The only legal method was to secure a warrant before proceeding against the regicides. But he preferred to kidnap, because he was convinced that this was the only certain method. Such a procedure would be a violation of Dutch law, but he cared nothing for that provided he attained his object. Moreover, he had a sovereign contempt for Dutch unreadiness to resent an insult.

His next letter, however, showed that he had returned to the idea of securing a warrant, and that he found difficulties even in the way of doing that. He wrote that he had spoken to de Witt about "a dormant order to apprehend any of the excepted persons". That is, he wished a blank warrant which would permit him to seize upon any of the regicides. This was something he could not reasonably expect. De Witt at first said that it could not be done until the treaty between England and the Netherlands was concluded; he then admitted that it might be done without the treaty but only "by order of the states of Holland". Downing says that he asked de Witt's opinion in case he should seize the regicides without getting a warrant, and that de Witt answered that it would be the "surest way".⁸

Downing was now accurately informed as to the whereabouts of a number of the fugitives. Edward Dendy was at Rotterdam; John Okey and some others at Strassburg. John Hewson lay sick at Amsterdam, but was intending for Strassburg as soon as he recovered.⁹ Clarendon replied encouragingly, telling him that he was

⁶ Downing to Clarendon, June 6/16, 1661, and June 14/24, 1661. Japikse, p. 194, and Lister, *Life and Administration of Edward, first Earl of Clarendon*, III, 144.

⁷ Downing to Clarendon, July 8, 1661. Lister, *Clarendon*, III, 151-152.

⁸ Downing to Clarendon, July 15, 1661. Lister, III, 155.

⁹ *Ibid.*

to do all he could "to lay hands upon the rogues",¹⁰ but he sent no precise orders, without which Downing did not dare to carry out his kidnapping plans. He wrote again on July 22, expressing his disappointment at not receiving directions as to what he "was to do in the case of Dendy and Hewson".¹¹ Clarendon then notified him that Sir William Davidson, who had made the futile attempt of the previous December, had written that several of the "rogues" were lurking at Amsterdam, and that he had referred Davidson to Downing for advice. "Trust him well", he added, "for he can do great service."¹² Downing again demanded Clarendon's "particular directions", pointing out, as before, the probability that if he proceeded by getting a warrant from the Estates of Holland the fugitives would get wind of it, and be off before he could take them. He again suggested that he should seize them without first getting a warrant, but in that case he desired to have an assistant of great courage and daring. He asked for the aid of a certain Colonel Griffith, then in London, who appears to have been particularly recommended by Clarendon. In any case, if the kidnapping was to be done, he must have an order under the king's hand. He also wished a man-of-war placed at his disposition so that he could send off his captives as soon as he had taken them. He thought that he would be able to seize Dendy, though none of the others at that time.¹³

He then proceeded in his attempt to seize Dendy. First he interviewed several English officers in the military service of Holland to see if any of them would make the arrest without a warrant. None of them would, however. He was compelled to admit that they were justified in their refusal, because if any of them should attempt it in any of the towns, they would be pulled to pieces by the populace. This project having failed, he applied for an order from the Estates of Holland, though without much hope of being able to execute it. He went to de Witt, and asked him to remember his previous promise to assist him in procuring the order. But de Witt, to his embarrassment, denied that he had ever given such a promise, and absolutely refused to have anything to do with the matter. Hereupon Downing went to Admiral Opdam, and prevailed upon him to present to the Estates Downing's memorial soliciting the order for the arrest of Dendy. He expected a refusal, because the

¹⁰ Clarendon to Downing, July 19, 1661. British Museum, Add. MSS. 22919, f. 158.

¹¹ Downing to Clarendon, July 22, 1661. Clarendon MSS., vol. 104, f. 185.

¹² Clarendon to Downing, July 26, 1661. *Ibid.*, f. 7.

¹³ Downing to Clarendon, July 29, 1661. *Ibid.*, f. 200.

Estates had twice declined to grant a similar request of the King of France. But he says he so laid down the law to them that they yielded. All his efforts were thwarted, however, by de Witt's method of managing the business in the Estates. He raised objections against the granting of the order, and after it was granted, despite a promise to Downing to forward it immediately, delayed its transmission until the next day at noon.¹⁴ Moreover, the Estates had insisted on having the name of Dendy inserted in the warrant.¹⁵ The insertion of the name and the delay gave Dendy's friends an opportunity to warn him. He was notified by one of the magistrates of Rotterdam that a warrant was out for his arrest and that he would do well to leave the place at once, which he did.¹⁶

The result fortified Downing in his conviction that it was useless to attempt to do anything by getting a warrant, and he busied himself to contrive some other means of laying hands on his prey. Davidson advised him that Dendy had fled to Amsterdam, and Downing had an interview with the canny Scot as to the best way to proceed. They agreed that this would be to arrest the fugitives at Amsterdam on a charge of debt. Once arrested, Downing would transport them to England, and believed that no one would dare to interfere. So he gave Davidson a warrant under his own hand for the arrest of several of them on a charge of owing a sum of 200,000 guilders. It was the best project he could conceive, and if Davidson's information was correct, he believed it must succeed.¹⁷ Clarendon sympathized with him in his failure to catch Dendy, but assured him that he did "not know that you could do more then you did". He agreed that the way of proceeding by warrant was unlikely to succeed, and approved heartily of the new plan.¹⁸

The well-laid scheme miscarried however. When Davidson returned to Amsterdam after his conference with Downing, he found that the "rogues" had all gone out of town. He expected them back soon however.¹⁹ But the fugitives had been alarmed by the

¹⁴ Downing to Clarendon, August 12, 1661. *Ibid.*, ff. 227-228. He encloses a copy of his memorial, dated August 6. *Ibid.*, f. 216.

¹⁵ See the resolution demanding the name in *Secrete Resolutien van Holland en Westvriesland*, II. 320-321; also the warrant, with space left for insertion of the name, *ibid.*, p. 321; both dated August 6, 1661.

¹⁶ Deposition of Isaac Thompson, of Rotterdam, August 11, 1661. Clarendon MSS., vol. 104, f. 214.

¹⁷ Downing to Clarendon, August 19, 1661. *Ibid.*, f. 237. "Once arrested", says Downing, "then I would see who would then dare let them go."

¹⁸ Clarendon to Downing, August 16, 1661. Lister, III. 168-169. The date must be old style.

¹⁹ Davidson to Downing, August 25, 1661. Clarendon MSS., vol. 104, f. 238.

attempt on Dendy, and kept continually on the move.²⁰ In September Davidson sent word that "Dendy and two more of them" were back in Amsterdam, and Downing forwarded him the original warrant for the arrest of Dendy.²¹ Davidson was unable to serve it, however, and the disappointed diplomat again demanded the aid of Griffith, "to hunt them, or money to employ some other in that kinde if I can find out any who can be so proper for it".²² Davidson seemed to despair of success, and since they could not take any of the living, he suggested that they might avenge themselves on the dead. Hewson had died recently at Amsterdam, and the Scot thought it would be some satisfaction to tear his body out of its grave and dispatch it for England.²³ Downing thought this ghoulish suggestion worthy to be transmitted to Clarendon, and asked for his "Lordship's mind" as to it.²⁴ Clarendon could hardly have had any objection to the desecration of Hewson's grave and the mutilation of his remains, but to secure these objects would have been expensive and might have caused trouble with Holland. Apparently he had nothing to say in answer to the suggestion, or if he made any response it must have been unfavorable.

Downing soon had renewed hope. A fortnight after his despairing letter, he had made new discoveries that promised well. He was now informed that the regicides Corbet and Holland lived together, that their customary residence was in Zwolle or Campen, but that at times they visited Amsterdam, Delft, and other Dutch cities. Better still, he had ferreted out the agent at Delft who had charge of their affairs. This was one Abraham Kick, an Englishman, who conveyed to the fugitives "both their letters and money". With his usual promptness, Downing secured an interview with this man, measured his character at a glance, and attacked him on that side which his long experience told him was least able to bear a strain. He offered Abraham £200 a head for as many regicides as he could betray into his hands, besides a few other coveted favors. Then, to add wings to Kick's zeal, he threatened him with absolute

²⁰ "They are perpetually changing their abode else that way we agreed would and will take them." Downing to Clarendon, September 2, 1661. Clarendon MSS., vol. 105, f. 18. "For the murderers nothing protects them here but their continuall removeings from place to place, never being two nights in a place." Same to same, September 16, 1661. *Ibid.*, f. 37.

²¹ Downing to Clarendon, September 9, 1661. *Ibid.*, f. 26.

²² Same to same, September 16, 1661. *Ibid.*, f. 37.

²³ "That roge Hewson the Cobeler his seafft us a truble, he being deade, and was this weeke buried heere, as I am informed. . . . Seing we could not gett him apprehended in his lifetime, methinckes giff you plees under Correctione, that you may gett him taene out of his grave and send him for England." Davidson to Downing, September 22, 1661. Clarendon MSS., vol. 105, f. 52.

²⁴ Downing to Clarendon, September 23, 1661. *Ibid.*, f. 50.

ruin if he did not comply.²⁵ Kick was amenable to the law of England for having assisted the criminals, and though he might be safe in Holland he could never return home, and even in Holland, Downing's influence might be sufficient to compass the ruin he threatened. Urged forward by avarice and fear, Kick yielded and henceforth exhibited zeal and devotion in performing his odious task.

Downing had to leave for Cleves immediately after making his arrangements with Kick, but he secured the promise of a certain Major Miles, an officer in one of the English regiments in the Dutch service, that he would seize the regicides if they came to Delft in the ambassador's absence. Kick was to give instant warning to the major if the regicides appeared. But here Downing suffered a disappointment which a man with a keener sense of honor would have foreseen intuitively. Men like Miles had no fancy for the job. They felt that it was dirty business, unfit for a gentleman to engage in. Kick came to the Hague during Downing's absence, apprized Miles that the fugitives were in Delft, and offered to lead him to the house in which they were lodging. Miles excused himself on the ground of being too ill to go, and thus the opportunity was lost, much to Downing's sorrow and disgust. He credited Miles's unwillingness to the fact that he was in the pay of the Dutch, and therefore might lose his position if he engaged in an illegal act. He was sure that if Colonel Griffith or "any such that had had no dependence heer" had been at hand, the business would have been done. But "it shall go hard but I will catch some of them".²⁶

He now redoubled his pleadings with Clarendon to lend some efficient assistance. In November, he "would to God the King would send some hither to see to the execution" of the business. Kick had informed him of the exact house in Campen in which Holland dwelt, and "to have this particular and punctuall Intelligence and yet not to be able to take him doth very much trouble me". Kick had also told him that Barkstead, Okey, and Walton were living near Frankfort. Downing despaired of being able to seize them, but he suggested another device which would serve quite as satisfactorily. "What if the King should authorize and send some trusty persons to kill them prey upon the whole lett me have the King's serious thoughts and directions about this business."²⁷

In answer to this letter Clarendon at last sent over the redoubt-

²⁵ Downing to Clarendon, October 4, 1661. *Ibid.*, ff. 64-65.

²⁶ Downing to Clarendon, October 21, 1661. *Ibid.*, f. 71.

²⁷ Downing to Clarendon, November 11, 1661. *Ibid.*, ff. 100-101.

able and long-desired Colonel Griffith to carry through the job. "I am hartily glad that hee is come", wrote Downing, "for I fynd him reall."²⁸ Things now moved apace. Three weeks after Griffith's arrival, Kick sent to Downing a letter from Barkstead then at Frankfort.²⁹ It is a piteous epistle viewed in the light of after events, though undoubtedly Downing gloated over it. Barkstead addresses Kick as "My reall freind" and tells the treacherous scoundrel that he has ordered a "trunk wth cloathes", sent from England by his wife, to be delivered to Kick. He adds "myself and Mr. Williamson [a pseudonym for Okey] intend to be wth you about the latter end of ffebruery or the begining of March and hope then to meet or wives wth you, they have promised us in part."³⁰ Downing urged Clarendon to give specific instructions to Griffith for the capture of the two when they visited Holland in the spring.³¹ Unfortunately for this plan, difficulty now arose with Griffith. That bold gentleman insisted on returning to London to talk the matter over with Clarendon. Downing strove to persuade him to remain in the Hague, "but he had no mind" to go forward with the affair, "till he had spoken wth yr Lordship". Apparently the dare-devil soldier had concluded that the work was not fit for a gentleman. However, he promised Downing to return in two weeks,³² then departed, and never reappeared.

Meanwhile Kick had received another letter from Barkstead who commissioned him to discover if there was any danger in his and Okey's coming to Holland. This he brought to Downing, and was instructed to send back word that the envoy had no order to apprehend or molest them, and "that they might be as free and safe there as himself".³³

Downing, having lost Griffith, now consulted Colonel Killegrew,

²⁸ Downing to Clarendon, December 9, 1661. Clarendon MSS., vol. 105, f. 169.

²⁹ Same to same, January 13, 1662. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 43.

³⁰ Copy of letter in Downing's hand in Clarendon MSS., vol. 106. Dated December 24/January 3, 1661/2. The letter is enclosed in Downing's of January 13.

³¹ Downing to Clarendon, January 13, 1662. *Ibid.*, f. 43.

³² Same to same, January 27, 1662. *Ibid.*, f. 67.

³³ "Kick hath this weeke receaved another letter from Baxter wherein he still assures him, of his intentions of coming hither wth his friends in the spring, to meete their Wives here from England and desires to be informed by him, if there should be any thing of danger." Downing to Clarendon, January 27, 1662. *Ibid.*, f. 69. That Downing sent an answer is evident from the report of the friends of the regicides. They say that a friend was particularly engaged by Okey to acquaint Sir George Downing with their intentions in case he had no order from the king to seize them. Downing assured him he had no order to apprehend or molest them, but "that they might be as free and safe there as himself". The *Speeches, Discourses and Prayers of Col. John Barkstead, Col. John Okey, and Mr. Miles Corbet*, Thomason Tracts, 1416 C. 30. The tract says that Okey sent word. Downing says Barkstead. Undoubtedly the point about using Okey's name lay in the fact that he had been Downing's patron and benefactor.

head of one of the English regiments in the Dutch service. He brought Kick and Killegrew to an interview. Killegrew advised against attempting anything without a warrant from the Estates of Holland. He declared "absolutely that no man dares to undertake it without an order and that if any shold that the Burgers would knock them on the head". This put poor Downing "into a very greate difficulty", for if he should undertake the task of seizing them without a warrant, and without an order from the king, and any harm should befall, he feared that the king would take it ill. "I would to God", he cries, "Griffith had kept his word or at least that I had his Ma^{ties} expresse order which of these 2 wayes to take."³⁴ His uncertainty did not last long. Killegrew's assurances that nothing could be done without a warrant from the Estates of Holland decided him to give up his kidnapping programme, and to depend upon legal means, however hopeless they might seem.³⁵

Barkstead and Okey reached Delft in the first weeks of March and went directly to the trusted Kick. The poor wretches engaged Kick, in whom their confidence was unlimited, "to goe wth this packet for England for their wives". Meanwhile they would lodge with him for the two nights before his departure on that errand. Downing determined to apply for a warrant from the Estates of Holland, and then without a moment's delay to go himself and superintend the arrest, having at last concluded that it was vain to depend on anyone else to do the work. He resolved to take with him Major Miles and any other English officers whom he could engage and enough people from his own household to make the arrest without the assistance of the local authorities, in case they should be unwilling to serve the warrant. Kick had brought the news on Tuesday, the 14th of March, and Downing at once set Thursday evening for the capture, and nine o'clock as the hour. He instructed Kick to invite Miles Corbet, another of the regicides then in Delft, to come to his house that evening to take supper with Okey and Barkstead, so that he might catch all three at the same time.³⁶

Every step he took evidences his extreme cunning and ability. He waited until the last moment before applying for the order from

³⁴ Downing to Clarendon, February 28/March 10, 1661/2. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 114. Clarendon seems to have found fault with Downing for interviewing Killegrew about the matter, apparently thinking that the ambassador was attempting to get Killegrew to undertake the kidnapping. Downing at least writes that he had no intention of engaging Killegrew except for advice. To Clarendon, March 7/17, 1661/2. *Ibid.*, f. 122.

³⁵ Same to same. *Ibid.*

³⁶ Downing to Clarendon, March 7/17, 1661/2. *Ibid.*, f. 122.

the Estates, in order that the chances of warning being given to the regicides should be reduced to the minimum. On Thursday afternoon about half-past two, he applied to de Witt at the latter's house. He told that gentleman that now he had an opportunity to do the King of England a most "acceptable kindness" by procuring for him an order from the Estates of Holland for the arrest of three regicides. The order must be in Downing's hands before seven o'clock that evening, however, or it would be of no value. To make discovery still more difficult, Downing did not inform de Witt either as to the names of the persons to be arrested or as to their place of abode. De Witt, who was very anxious to secure good terms in the treaty then being negotiated between the provinces and England, was probably influenced by this consideration to go farther than he had ever gone before,³⁷ and so without getting the names of persons or place, he undertook to procure the warrant. Downing then returned home, and wrote out a request to the Estates for the grant of the warrant, and sent this to de Witt, who presented it to the Estates at six in the evening. The Estates, not having the names, were compelled to issue the warrant in blank, but with the condition that de Witt should procure the names and have them inserted before delivering the warrant to Downing, "for they would not trust me with a blank order". They neglected, however, to ask for the name of the place in which the warrant was to be executed. De Witt notified Downing that he must have the names of the persons, and Downing sent his secretary with the information. De Witt inserted the names in the warrant "with his own hand", and then gave the document to Downing's secretary, who at once carried it to his master.³⁸ Probably de Witt and the Estates never dreamed that the warrant could be served that evening, and were confident that by morning everyone in the Hague would know the names of the fugitives, and these would receive timely warning.

If such was their calculation, they reckoned without their host, for Delft is only a short four miles from the Hague and Downing's plans were all laid for immediate seizure. Major Miles and two other English officers were already at his house, and calling to his assistance a number of his own employees at the embassy he

³⁷ Downing's argument about doing the king an acceptable service is itself testimony to Downing's belief that this would appeal to de Witt. "Dat het den Koningh aengenaem, ende aen de Tractaten vorderlijck soude sijn." Aitzema, IV. 896. Aitzema is presenting this as an argument of Downing's. "En Hollande on fist au delà de ce qu'on devoit, pour tascher de s'acquérir l'amitié du Roy par une complaisance basse et indigne d'un Estat Souverain." A. de Wicquefort, *Histoire des Provinces Unies des Païs Bas* (van Buren's ed.), III. 76.

³⁸ Downing to Clarendon, March 7/17, 1661/2. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 123.

hastened to Delft by boat, starting at about half-past seven. He reached Delft in good time and disposed of his men in the New Church yard, each man by himself, so that no suspicions might be aroused by seeing so many together. He and Miles then hurried off to the bailiff³⁹ of Delft, whose business it was to see the warrant executed. As he expected, the bailiff made difficulties, but finally sent Downing and Miles to the under-bailiff⁴⁰ who should see the order served. The under-bailiff seemed to have no more stomach for the job than his superior. However, he sent out for his police. But none of these officers could be found. Downing was on pins and needles, for fear that Corbet would have returned to his lodgings, and so would escape. He urged the under-bailiff to delay no longer, telling him that his men were not needed, since he himself had force enough at hand to make the arrest. At the same time he offered to pay him well for his trouble, being confident that a petty official would not be inaccessible to a bribe, especially when it was given as payment for doing his duty. The underling at once yielded. Downing collected his men from the churchyard, and under the lead of Miles they hurried off to Kick's house. Miles knocked and Kick himself came to the door. The crowd rushed in tumultuously and found the three men sitting before an open fire, smoking a friendly pipe of tobacco. Downing was just in time, for Corbet's lantern had been lighted, and in a moment he would have been off for home. The regicides sprang up at the sudden onslaught and rushed for their weapons, which they had left in another room. But the wily Kick had taken the precaution to lock the door of this room, and the poor wretches were overpowered without having the meagre consolation of defending themselves. The under-bailiff had now found his police and they came in and manacled the prisoners, "and so in the still of the night", says Downing complacently, "carried them to the prison where I took care that they were forthwith putt each into a sevrall roome and that no body shold come to speak wth them".⁴¹

Thus the first step in the well-laid plan had succeeded beyond the expectation of everyone excepting Downing. The men were caged. But the affair was by no means concluded with the successful arrest. Downing must now secure an order for their delivery to him. That very night he hastened back to the Hague, and the next morning he was at de Witt again to procure a second order from the Estates instructing the authorities of Delft to deliver the

³⁹ Schout.

⁴⁰ Onderschout.

⁴¹ Downing to Clarendon, March 7/17, 1661/2. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 123.

captives to him for their extradition to England. He also sent word to an English frigate then in harbor at Helvoetsluys to remain there to receive the prisoners.⁴² De Witt could hardly refuse to get the second order, after having procured the first, so Downing's request was complied with, though the Estates of Holland found many excellent reasons why it should not be.⁴³ No sooner had Downing received this order, than he notified the bailiff of Delft, and the next day he rushed back to that town and delivered it to the bailiff. This official had no desire to give up the prisoners, and he at once objected that the order was addressed to him and the aldermen⁴⁴ and that he must consult them before taking any action. He would call them together, but the meeting could not be held before two in the afternoon. Downing said very well, he would wait. At two the aldermen met, but they pleaded that there was to be a funeral of importance that afternoon which they must attend. Consequently they could transact no business until after that event. But they would meet again at seven in the evening. They also called Downing's attention to the fact that by the terms of the order from the Estates they were to be satisfied that the men were the men named in the warrant.

Downing was annoyed, and complained to the bailiff of these pretexts, as he considered them. He said that he knew that the bailiff and aldermen had already twice visited the prisoners, and had been satisfied that they were the men named in the warrant. The bailiff was compelled to admit it. Having got this admission, Downing then offered the bailiff a bribe. He had made inquiries about the man, and had been told that he "was one that would do nothing without mony". So he promised him a reward if he would be true to his trust until the prisoners were in Downing's hands.⁴⁵ The bailiff was thus won. The aldermen met again at seven, but found that not enough of them were present to transact such important business. They promised that they would meet the next day at 11 o'clock.⁴⁶ This confirmed Downing's suspicion that they intended to find some pretext for releasing the prisoners. He

⁴² Same letter. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 124.

⁴³ Aitzema, IV. 896. After giving the various arguments against the surrender, Aitzema concludes, "Maer alles wel overleghet, is raedtsaem gevonden de selve t'extraderen aen de Heer Downingh".

⁴⁴ Schepenen.

⁴⁵ Downing to Clarendon, March 13/23, 1661/2. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 130.

⁴⁶ "They could not make their full number at that time wch they desired to have in a matter of that importance, but that without fayle they would meet the next day being Sunday at 11 of the Clocke after sermon and would then send me their answer by a servt of their owne." Same to same. *Ibid.*, f. 131.

trusted however that his promise to the bailiff would serve to engage that gentleman to keep the prisoners safe until he could discover some other expedient for getting them into his hands.

Meanwhile he was driven frantic by the efforts made to secure the release of the regicides. The bailiff himself assured Downing that he feared lest the "common people might go about to force the prison and let them out".⁴⁷ The magistrates of Amsterdam sent a message to those of Delft urging them to "let the Gates of the prison be opened and so let them escape".⁴⁸ Then the authorities of Delft made an effort to secure counsel for the regicides. At the request of the prisoners they summoned Kick to their presence and ordered him to go to the Hague to procure the services of "a very able Advocate" of that place. Kick, of course, went instantly to Downing. The ambassador, having heard the name of the lawyer, recognized it as that of a man who had held King Charles's commission in Holland as royal advocate during the interregnum. The man still held the commission, though he had no benefit from it. Nevertheless, the situation furnished him with a motive for coming to Downing for advice before acting. Downing, therefore, did not hesitate a moment to send Kick to the advocate with the message of the Delft authorities. As he expected, the lawyer came at once to him for advice. Downing asked him if it was customary for the authorities to secure counsel for prisoners, to which the advocate replied in the negative, and added that he gathered from the fact that he had been summoned that the authorities of Delft did not intend to surrender the prisoners. Downing then advised him to go to Delft at once, but instead of giving aid to the prisoners, he should warn his friends there "to have a care" not to assist the prisoners or let them escape, "whch accordingly he did very faithfully".⁴⁹

Thus the regicides' hope of securing legal advice was thwarted, and the man whom they had counted upon to advocate their cause was particularly efficient in hindering them from receiving legal assistance. So vanished the most hopeful means of their securing their release, for the arguments in law for their discharge were so good that one of two things must have happened. Either they would have been at once set free, or so long a delay would have been interposed that popular sentiment would have made impossible their delivery to Downing. But even now the danger was by no means over. Two wealthy Englishmen came to Delft and offered large bribes to the bailiff and under-bailiff if they would let the

⁴⁷ Downing to Clarendon, March 14/24, 1661/2. *Ibid.*, f. 138.

⁴⁸ Same to same, March 21/31, 1661/2. *Ibid.*, f. 152.

⁴⁹ Same to same, March 13/23, 1661/2. *Ibid.*, f. 132.

prisoners go. To circumvent this attempt Downing forthwith sent his secretary and another of his servants to remain night and day in the prison.⁵⁰ He got them placed in a room next to that containing the regicides, so that they could look in upon them at any time and see that they did not disappear.⁵¹ He also bribed all the watchmen and police of the town, so that they would be faithful in case of a popular rising to liberate the prisoners.⁵²

Meanwhile the aldermen had held their Sunday session, but instead of voting to hand the miscreants over to Downing, they determined to send off a letter to the Estates of Holland pleading for the liberation of the prisoners. As soon as Downing learned this, he hastened off to de Witt and told him that "the Estates were now too farr ingaged to retriect and that this delatory boggling did spoyle all the grace of the busines". He requested that another order for the delivery of the prisoners should be given him, addressed solely to the bailiff, seeing that the aldermen would in all probability never consent to surrender them, whereas he was confident that the bailiff would stick in order to secure his reward. De Witt seems to have been convinced by his argument that having gone thus far the authorities could not refuse to go farther. He promised Downing that when the letter of the aldermen on behalf of the prisoners was read, he would see the matter through the Estates. But he must wait another day before this could be done, because the Estates would not meet sooner.⁵³ This was agonizing, for the prisoners were now creating a party in their favor among the members of the government. Moreover, the people of the country as well as many English men and women from Rotterdam were petitioning the Estates on their behalf,⁵⁴ and the Dutch lawyers "universally declared that it was against all right and reason" that the prisoners should be delivered to Downing.⁵⁵

Meanwhile many Dutch notables visited the prison and heard the regicides' defense. These tried to arouse sympathy by asserting that they were Presbyterians; that they had taken arms in the late war simply to overthrow the bishops; that they were not regicides; that they had understood that Holland was a free country into which any man might come; that there was no proclamation forbidding their coming there, as in all honor there should have been if the

⁵⁰ Downing to Clarendon, March 13/23, 1661/2. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 132.

⁵¹ Same to same. *Ibid.*, f. 134.

⁵² Same to same; *ibid.*, f. 133. March 14/24; *ibid.*, f. 136.

⁵³ Same to same, March 13/23, 1661/2. *Ibid.*, ff. 132-133.

⁵⁴ Same to same, March 14/24. *Ibid.*, ff. 136 and 138. See a petition of this sort in Aitzema, IV. 897.

⁵⁵ Downing to Clarendon, March 14/24, 1661/2. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 138.

country was not free to them; that they came with the intention of laying out ten thousand pounds to establish cloth manufactures among the Dutch.⁵⁶ In addition Okey and Barkstead exhibited letters under the seal of Hanau showing that they were citizens of that city.⁵⁷ They therefore besought that they should be released. The notables expressed their sympathy with the prisoners and promised that they would do all in their power to assist them.⁵⁸ Meanwhile crowds of people came with the notables, and as these would not allow the doors of the prison to be closed while they were present, Downing's servants were in an agony of fear lest the prisoners should escape.⁵⁹ On this Downing redoubled his precautions, sent more men to assist in watching the prisoners, and instructed his secretary not to be sparing in his largesses to the lower officials, and to reassure the bailiff in regard to the reward that was coming to him. On that night, Tuesday the 21st of March, a last desperate attempt seems to have been made to secure the liberation of the regicides. The under-bailiff tried to compel Downing's watchers to vacate the room in which they had hitherto held their guard and to remove to another room from which they could not look in upon the prisoners. No doubt the under-bailiff would then have permitted them to escape. An appeal to the bailiff thwarted this scheme, he ordering that the watchers should stay where they were, and sending one of his own people to remain at the prison and see that the order was obeyed.⁶⁰

On the day that this last feeble attempt was made, the letter from the aldermen of Delft to the Estates of Holland was read in the Estates and de Witt fulfilled his promise to Downing. Instead of giving ear to the prayer of the aldermen in behalf of the prisoners, the Estates granted another order for their delivery to Downing. This time they directed it to the bailiff alone.⁶¹ This would assure obedience to the order. Armed with this authority, Downing hastened once more to Delft resolved that "no other trick" should be put upon him. He handed the order to the bailiff, who at once agreed to execute it.⁶² Downing had procured from the English frigate two officers and a guard of sailors, de Witt having assured

⁵⁶ Same to same, March 13/23, 1661/2; *ibid.*, f. 133. March 14/24; *ibid.*, f. 136.

⁵⁷ Same to same, March 14/24, 1661/2. *Ibid.*, f. 139.

⁵⁸ Same to same, March 13/23, 1661/2. *Ibid.*, f. 133.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Downing to Clarendon, March 13/23, 1661/2. *Ibid.*, f. 134.

⁶¹ Same to same. *Ibid.*, f. 133.

⁶² Same to same. *Ibid.*, ff. 133 and 135.

him that no assistance would be afforded by Dutch officials, once the prisoners were surrendered to him.⁶³

There still remained the problem of getting the prisoners out of the jail and on board the frigate without giving rise to a riot in the town. The Estates, in granting the last order to Downing, had desired him to have it executed with "all possible speed", fearing that there might otherwise be forcible opposition to the measure.⁶⁴ The bailiff assured Downing that he apprehended there would be a rising "if there were but the least notice of an intention to carry them away". After an anxious discussion, Downing

resolved in the dead of the night to get a boate into a litle channell which came neare behinde the prison, and at the very first dawning of the day without so much as giving any notice to the seamen I had provided . . . forthwith to slip them downe the backstaires . . . and so accordingly we did, and there was not the least notice in the Towne thereof, and before 5 in the morning the boate was without the Porto of Delft, where I delivered them to Mr. Armerer . . . giving him direction not to put them a shoare in any place, but to go the whole way by water to the Blackamore Frigat at Helverdsluice.⁶⁵

The plan was carried out to the last detail, and Downing had reason to congratulate himself upon his precautions, for he was told the next day that "those of Delft say down right that if they had known wn they had been taken away a piece of paper meaning the Estates order shold not have taken them away".⁶⁶ But then it was too late. Downing had worked his will. Having delivered the prisoners to Armourer, he sat down at once and wrote the account of his triumph to Clarendon, from Delft at four o'clock in the morning of March 23, 1661. While he enlarged on his merits to the chancellor, the hunted wretches, who had made their long, arduous, and perilous trip from Germany to see the faces of their wives after long and bitter separation, were carried slowly through the canals of Holland in the chilly air of an early March morning, put aboard the *Blackamoor*, carried to England, and a few weeks later executed with all the indignities and horrors which English law then visited upon traitors.

The event surprised and astonished everybody. Such a thing had never been done before in Holland, Downing proudly declared,

⁶³ Downing to Clarendon. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, ff. 133 and 134.

⁶⁴ Same to same, March 14/24, 1661/2. *Ibid.*, f. 138.

⁶⁵ Same to same. *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Same to same, March 21/31, 1661/2. *Ibid.*, f. 153.

and "no body believed was possible to be done".⁶⁷ The testimony of the contemporary Dutch historians is to the same effect.⁶⁸ It is altogether probable that de Witt and his supporters had no idea that the thing could be done. The bailiff of Delft asserted to Downing that he had trapped the gentlemen of the Estates: "had they imagined you could have taken them they would never have given you an order to do it".⁶⁹ Moreover, the Estates probably thought that if worst came to worst, the people of the country were so bitterly opposed to the surrender that they would hinder it. Undoubtedly there was justification for such an opinion. Certain it is that the Dutch felt humiliated at the success of Downing's plans. They say, said Downing, that Holland is "no longer a free Countrey, and that no man is now sure here".⁷⁰

The Dutch were depressed, but the English Royalists were elated. The king himself wrote Downing a "most gracious" letter. The gratified recipient answered in an epistle which reveals his fawning and servile nature in every line.⁷¹ Clarendon also wrote praising him: "You did never any thing more advantageous to your selfe and your reputation then your conduct of this last businesse."⁷² Secre-

⁶⁷ Same to same, March 7/17, 1661/2. *Ibid.*, f. 124. Again, "Every one is astonished that I shold carry it through there having been no proclamation to forbid these people this Countrey nor any Treaty wth his Majty that obligeth them to deliver them." March 13/23. *Ibid.*, f. 130.

⁶⁸ Aitzema, IV. 896, says of the Estates after the arrest, "Men was in der daedt gesurpreneert, ende als beschaemt; ende hadde wel gewilt datse duyzent mijl van hier waren." Wicquefort (ed. van Buren), III. 77, says, "Ceux qui avoient le plus contribué à faire prendre une resolution si prejudiciable à l'honneur de la Province, et qui devoit faire exemple, firent bien les estonnés."

⁶⁹ "Mr. vous avez attrappéz Messrs. les Etats." Downing to Clarendon, March 21/31, 1661/2. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, ff. 152-153.

⁷⁰ "And there is not a thing that hath happened these many yeares that hath occasioned so much discourse here, saying that they are now no longer a free Countrey, and that no man is now sure here." Same to same. *Ibid.*, f. 152.

⁷¹ "What I have done is no more than my duty, and therefore had no reson to expect any acknowledgement therof, but to have it and that immediately from yrselfe under yr owne hand and in such termes is a favour and honour altogether surprising and confounding, such as I could not in my whole life have hoped to have attayned, nor can sufficiently admire and esteeme. I do from the day of the receipt thereof account myselfe perfectly and compleately happy, as having lived to see my King upon his Throne, and myselfe not only pardoned but received into his Grace employed and bestrusted by him and my poor endeavours thus accepted, And wt time more it shall please God to afford me in this world shall be no other than a continuall reall sacrifice of thanksgiving, joyned wth a redowbled inflamed zeale to the last moment more and more to approve myselfe in all humility and faithfullnesse,

yr Majtyes most Loyall and
most obedient Subject
and servant
G. Downing."

Downing to the king, March 28/April 9, 1662. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 164.

⁷² Japikse, p. 197, n. 3.

tary Morice assured him, "Wee doe heere al magnify your diligence and prudente conduct in the seisinge and conveyinge over of the regicides, and we think few others would have used such dexterity or could have compassed so difficil a busines."⁷³ The voice of praise was not unanimous however. The friends of the regicides, while they admitted Downing's diligence and dexterity, had quite other thoughts about him. In a pamphlet written by some of them after the execution, they taunt him with his Judas-like betrayal of Okey, who they declare "gave him his first bread in England", raised him "from the dust", and "Cloathed and Fed" him "at his table" when he was nothing but a "New-England Tottered Chaplain".⁷⁴ What the world in general thought is well expressed by Pepys: "Though the action is good and of service to the King, yet he cannot with a good conscience do it." "All the world takes notice of him for a most ungrateful villaine for his pains."⁷⁵

De Witt, too, was thanked, both by Downing in the name of the king and in the name of Clarendon,⁷⁶ and again by Clarendon on behalf of the king.⁷⁷ The king, at Downing's suggestion,⁷⁸ sent a grateful letter to the Estates of Holland⁷⁹ and personally thanked the Dutch ambassadors then in England.⁸⁰ All these gentlemen must have received the gracious acknowledgments with wry faces and uneasy consciences, for it was and is the opinion of all fair-minded men that the government of Holland came out of the affair very badly. Ludlow, though not an impartial judge, expresses in his *Memoirs* the prevalent feeling. He says:

The most remarkable matter in the entire transaction [was] the barbarous part acted by the States in this conjuncture, who, tho' they . . . to that time had made it a fundamental maxim to receive and protect all

⁷³ Morice to Downing, March 21/31, 1661/2. Add. MSS., 22919, f. 203.

⁷⁴ *The Speeches, Discourses and Prayers of Col. John Barkstead, Col. John Okey, and Mr. Miles Corbet*, p. 3.

⁷⁵ *Diary and Correspondence of Samuel Pepys*, under dates of March 12 and 17, 1662.

⁷⁶ Downing to Clarendon, March 21/31, 1661/2. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 154.

⁷⁷ This is evident from de Witt's answer to Clarendon.

⁷⁸ Downing to Clarendon, March 13/23, 1661/2. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 134.

⁷⁹ "His Majesty hath sent his thanks to the States of Holland for the respect showne to his Majesty in their ready assistance to apprehend and secure those 3 Regicides Miles Corbet, Okey and Barkstead now prisoners in the Tower of London." *Mercurius Publicus*, March 20-27, 1662, p. 184. See also Japikse, p. 198, n. 3.

⁸⁰ Ambassadors to de Witt, March 31, 1662. *Brieven, geschreven ende gewisselt tusschen de Herr Johan de Witt, ende de Gevolmaghtigden von den Staedt der Vereenigde Nederlanden*, vol. IV., p. 227.

those who should come among them; yet contrary to the principles of their government, and the interest of their Commonwealth, to say nothing of the laws of God, nature and nations, without any previous engagement to the Court of England, contributed as much as in them lay to the destruction of these gentlemen.⁸¹

That de Witt was ashamed of his part in the transaction is deducible from his behavior afterwards. He replied very coldly to Clarendon's letter conveying the king's thanks⁸² and in writing to the Dutch ambassadors disclaimed any merit in the affair, declaring that he had merely acted as the servant of the Estates of Holland. He also expressed the wish that the ambassadors had not mentioned his name in their letter to the Estates describing their interview with the king.⁸³

The members of the government of Holland also felt that they had acted badly, for many of them thought that a letter should be sent by the Estates to the king requesting leniency for the prisoners. One of the number came to Downing to confer with him as to the advisability of such action. His advice was that they sound the government in England before taking any such step, so as not to risk a rebuff.⁸⁴ De Witt thereupon made this suggestion to the Dutch ambassadors.⁸⁵ They replied that the king had expressed himself as exceedingly well satisfied with what had been done by the Estates in the arrest of the regicides. Also that the common speech in regard to the Dutch was favorably affected by the act. They were convinced that any intercession would be badly received and would destroy the excellent impression created by the arrest and extradition. As a consequence they had not thought it advisable to make any inquiries regarding the matter from anyone of credit.⁸⁶

⁸¹ *Memoirs* (ed. Firth), II. 331.

⁸² De Witt to Clarendon, April 11, 1662. *Documents Inédits: Mélange Historique; Choix de Documents*, I. 219. See the same letter in Wicquefort, III. 78, n. 3, dated as of April 21.

⁸³ De Witt to the ambassadors, April 7, 1662. *Brieven*, IV. 228-229.

⁸⁴ "I did forgett to give yr Lordp an account that the Estates of Holland had many of them a greate minde to have had a letter written in the Estates name, to his Maty on the behalfe of the 3 prisoners at least that they might not be executed but one of them coming to me to sound me about it I told him that they would do well to be very carefull how they ingaged themselves in that kinde, but he still pressing very earnestly that the Estates could not do lesse wth many arguments which are not worth troubling yor Lordp with, I told him that they should do well in the first place to let their Ambrs underhand sound some at Court, and then they being upon the place, would be able to give them good and true Councell, and by this meanes I putt him off." Downing to Clarendon, March 28/April 7, 1662. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 169.

⁸⁵ De Witt to the ambassadors, March 24, 1662. *Brieven*, IV. 225, postscript.

⁸⁶ Ambassadors to de Witt, March 31, 1662. *Brieven*, IV. 227. The entire episode furnishes an excellent illustration of de Witt's cunning, subtle, and sub-

The Hollanders thus completed their record of baseness and timidity, and the last faint hope of the regicides vanished.

After thanks came the more substantial rewards. Downing asked for £1,200 as necessary to cover the expenses of the capture and extradition.⁸⁷ Kick was to receive £600 of this, besides the promise of His Majesty's pardon, and a waiter's place in the custom's house in some good port in England.⁸⁸ The bailiff was to have not less than 200 pieces.⁸⁹ The under-bailiff and lesser officers were also to be recompensed generously. The police and watchmen of the town of Delft had also received considerable sums. Major Miles was to have a piece of plate worth forty or fifty pounds, while the two other English officers who assisted in making the arrest were to be given better places.⁹⁰ Sir William Davidson was made the king's resident in the Netherlands for Scotland.⁹¹ Nor did Downing forget himself in his recommendations. He pressed for the fulfillment of a promise made to him of certain properties in the bishopric of Durham, and of a long lease of a house in what is now Downing Street.⁹² There was no denying the value

terrenean methods, by which in more than one instance he succeeded in over-reaching himself. He always attempted to satisfy the wishes of everyone in appearance, and then thwart them by underhand dealings at the very moment they supposed themselves secure of their objects. When he attempted to employ this method with Downing, he found an adversary quite his overmatch in subtlety and cunning, as well as in decision and action.

⁸⁷ Downing to Clarendon, March 13/23, 1661/2; Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 134. March 14/24; *ibid.*, 139.

⁸⁸ Same to same, March 7/17, 1661/2. *Ibid.*, f. 124.

⁸⁹ Same to same, March 13/23, 1661/2. *Ibid.*, f. 134.

⁹⁰ "Moreover, I must be generous to the Scout Under scout and his men and to the Officers of the prison, and I must pay for their carrying to the ship and give Lieut Willoughby and Lieut Ogle mony to carry them for England. . . . I would out of that mony bestow (if his Majty thought fitt) upon Major Miles a piece of plate of about 40 or 50 pounds, and for these two Lieuts who come over with them if his Majty would please to take notice of them as to some preferring at Dunkirk wⁿ it falls or as to some employment for Portugall." Downing to Clarendon, March 7/17, 1661/2. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 124.

⁹¹ Aitzema, IV. 898.

⁹² "I pray also that yr Lordship will pardon me if I putt you in mind that yr Lordship did give me a letter to Dr. Berwick the Deane of Durham that it was his Majtyes pleasure that I shold be considered as to my little pretension there but I had no benefitt thereby, and now there is another Deane and unless yr Lordship will be pleased of yrself to write effectually to him nothing will be done, wⁿ Dr. Berwick left that place he did putt him that succeeds in mind of yr Lrdships Letter but nothing will come of it unlesse yr Lordship will be gratusly pleased to make it yr Concerne, also yr Lordship was pleased to move his Majty as to my having a long lease of that howse in King Street in wch Mrs. Hamden lives and his Majty did in my hearing leave it to yr Lordship to see it done for me wth my Lord Tresurer, but as yet there is not any progresse therein, I make bold humbly to putt yr Lordship in minde heerof, and that you will be pleased heerin to take care of me." Downing to Clarendon, March 21/31, 1661/2. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 153.

of his services and he received what he asked for.⁹³ Even de Witt was not ashamed to seize the opportune moment to solicit a favor from the English government. He "did earnestly . . . intreate" an order concerning his brother-in-law's ship of Amsterdam, taken by a "Portugall private man of warre and brought into Rye".⁹⁴ It is to be hoped that he received this small favor, for he, too, had earned a reward.

So ended this event, which made considerable noise in the world at that day, and certainly left everyone engaged in the capture to suffer the contempt of that and succeeding ages.

RALPH C. H. CATTERALL.

⁹³ Clarendon to Downing, March 28/April 7, 1662; Clarendon MSS., vol. 104, ff. 53-54. Same to same, April 11/21, 1662; *ibid.*, f. 56. Same to same, June 13/23, 1662; *ibid.*, folio unnumbered, but between 71 and 72. Downing sends thanks. To Clarendon, June 27/July 7, 1662; *ibid.*, vol. 106, f. 180. Clarendon to Downing, July 25/August 4, 1662; *ibid.*, vol. 104, f. 84.

⁹⁴ Downing to Clarendon, March 21/31, 1661/2. Clarendon MSS., vol. 106, f. 154.